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Divisional managers compete for financial resources in what is often referred to as an 
internal capital market. They also have a common interest in maximizing corporate 
profits, as this determines the resources available to the firm as a whole. Both goals 
are powerful motivators but can at times conflict: while the amount of resources 
available to the firm depends on corporate performance, divisional funding depends 
upon the division’s performance relative to the rest. We propose a model in which 
organizational form is endogenous, divisions compete for corporate resources, and 
managers have implicit incentives. We show that organizational design can help 
companies influence their divisional managers’ potentially conflicting goals. Our 
analysis relates the firm’s organizational structure to the source of incentives 
(external vs. internal), the nature of the incentives (competition vs. cooperation), the 
level of corporate diversification, the development of the capital market, and to 
industry and firm characteristics.
1. Introduction
In large corporations one of headquarters’ main functions, and arguably themost impor-
tant one, is the allocation of resources across different lines of business—this determines
how corporations grow and evolve over time. Divisional managers compete for re-
sources in what is often referred to as an internal capital market. Yet, managers have
also a common interest in increasing corporate profits so that the firm attains more re-
sources, which can then be channeled to all divisions. Both types of incentives motivate
managers but can sometimes conflict. For example, actively participating in a project
launched by another division can increase corporate profits but may not help one’s po-
sition when competing for internal resources. In fact, engaging in less profitable projects
might be more rewarding from the divisional managers’ perspective if they can more
convincingly claim credit for them. In order to prevent divisions’ particular interests
from harming firm performance, companies need to findways to channel those interests
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toward corporate goals. This article shows how an appropriate organizational structure
can help.
Weuse a career concernsmodel (Holmstro¨m, 1982) to formalize the dynamic nature
of incentives: investors and corporate headquarters draw inferences from current profits
about theproductivities of different lines of business,which are ex anteunknown, anduse
those inferences for capital budgeting. Divisional managers have incentives to influence
this learning process, and hence future investments, by taking costly unobserved actions
that increase profits. In this set up, we study how a multi-product firm fares under
different organizational structures, paying special attention to the most common types
of structure, the so-called unitary and multidivisional forms (U-form and M-form). In
a U-form organization, each divisional manager has responsibilities over all products
or business lines, but her responsibilities are limited to a single function, for example,
marketing or production; whereas in an M-form each divisional manager is responsible
for a single product and controls all functions related to that particular product.
Irrespective of the organizational form, in the model, headquarters are free to
decide how funds are allocated across products, but must allocate functional resources
in fixed proportions. The fixed proportions assumption is made for simplicity, the main
idea being that there is a greater degree of substitutability across products than across
functions. That is, firms can generally do without a particular line of business if it is not
profitable but need to invest in all functional areas for the lines of business in which
they operate.1 Empirically, large corporations tend to operate inmore than one SIC code,
and,more importantly, they are often involved in acquisitions, alliances, anddivestitures
(e.g., 86 Fortune-100 firms were involved in a total of 9,276 acquisitions, alliances, and
divestitures during the 1990s—see Villalonga and McGahan, 2005), which suggests that
reallocations of resources indeed occur primarily across products.
To understand the logic of the model, consider first a U-form organization. Given
that each division manages a number of functions across all products, the internal
allocation of resources by corporate headquarters does not induce competition among
divisional managers.2 In these organizations, a division’s funding is mainly determined
by the total amount of funds available for the whole corporation, which depends on
how investors perceive the firm. Divisional managers have incentives to improve this
perception by increasing current profits as this translates into more financing for the
corporation and hence, for their respective divisions.
Incentives work differently in an M-form organization. Because each division is
responsible for one product or line of business, a division’s funding depends not only on
the total funds available for the whole corporation, but also on the share of those funds
that are channeled to each product by corporate headquarters. In this case divisional
managers have incentives to improve both the external perception of the corporation (to
increase total funding) and the internal perception of their divisions (to increase their
own division’s internal funding). More importantly, these two objectives can conflict:
while internal competition for resources provides divisional managers with incentives
1. Even if a firm decides to outsource some functional processes, outsourcing is limited by informational
and hold-up problems (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986) and these processes still need to be funded (i.e.,
outsourced goods and services have to be paid for and firms must keep a minimum amount of in-house
resources to ensure proper coordination with suppliers).
2. In general, as long as headquarters’ reallocation of resources across products or business lines is more
important than across functions, a U-form organization will tend to induce less internal competition for
corporate resources than an M-form organization.
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to improve their respective divisions’ performance, it may come at the expense of coop-
eration with other divisions, and lead to lower overall profitability.
We show that the choice of organizational structure hinges on the size of the corpo-
ration, the development of the capital market, the value of cross-divisional cooperation,
and the industry’s and firm’s age. As corporations grow and diversify, the incentives to
increase total funding, whichwill be shared by all divisions, decrease, while competition
for internal resources intensifies. This makes M-forms more desirable than U-forms. In
contrast, when the capital market is well developed the benefits from internal compe-
tition are small relative to the cost of interdivisional conflicts of interest that arise in
M-forms, and thus U-forms are superior. This suggests that M-form organizations are
more valuable in less developed countries where capital markets play aweakermonitor-
ing role and are not capable of providingmanagerswith strong incentives. In addition, in
corporations where cooperation is important (e.g., because of a strong brand name that
all products benefit from) conflicts of interest caused by M-forms are especially harmful
and, all else equal, U-forms are more desirable. Finally, firms in younger industries, as
well as younger firms within an industry, are more likely to adopt a U-form organiza-
tion. In those industries and firms, there is more uncertainty about the profitability of
different lines of business, which gives rise to stronger implicit incentives (both external
and internal) and, as we show, raises the relative value of cooperation.
As this paper links organizational form and capital budgeting decisions, it bridges
and contributes to two research areas. First, it relates to the organizational design liter-
ature, and in particular, to Williamson’s (1975) analysis of informational asymmetries
and incentives, which has inspired much of the recent research on incentives within
organizations (see, for instance, Cre´mer, 1986; Itoh, 1991, 1993, 1994; Aghion and Tirole,
1995; Maskin et al., 2000; Harris and Raviv, 2002; Ortega, 2003; Besanko et al., 2005; Hart
and Moore, 2005; Qian et al., 2006; Harstad, 2007; Friebel and Raith, 2010). Our model
departs from this literature in one important aspect: its focus on the allocation of finan-
cial resources which we model as a two-tier capital budgeting process—investors and
headquarters.3 We also differ frommost of the literature on organizational design in the
nature on the incentives that we consider, that is, implicit incentives, as this literature,
with a few exceptions such as Ortega (2003) and Harstad (2007), has mainly focused
on explicit incentives. Moreover, while these two papers, and the literature on explicit
incentives and organizations (e.g., Maskin et al., 2000, Besanko et al., 2005), assume that
differences in incentives come from differences in observability across organizational
forms, we do not make such an assumption. Hence, the analysis shows that even if the
different organizational forms were to have the same informational structure, there are
other issues (in our case the allocation of responsibility across divisional managers) that
lead to differences in incentives and performance across organizational forms.
The second research area that we contribute to is the literature on internal capital
markets (see Stein, 2003, and the references therein for a review on this literature). Our
main contribution to this literature is to endogenize the organizational structure and
to analyze how organizational design, allocation of resources and divisional manager’s
incentives interact. For that purpose we build on Stein (1997) and consider corporate
3. Although the allocation of financial resources is key to corporate development, the organizational
design literature has, by and large, ignored it. For example, the models of hierarchies by Calvo and Wellisz
(1978) and others (Keren and Levhari, 1979; Qian, 1994) do not consider the allocation of financial resources.
Other models of organizations that focus on coordination or cooperation problems (Cre´mer, 1986; Itoh, 1991,
1993, 1994; Harris and Raviv, 2002; Hart and Moore, 2005; Qian et al., 2006; Dessein et al., 2010) also abstract
from capital budgeting.
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headquarters as an intermediary between investors and divisional managers whose
role is to create value by allocating resources across business lines. Other papers have
previously studied the relationship between managerial incentives and internal capital
markets (see, for instance, Gertner et al., 1994; Stein, 2002; de Motta, 2003; Bernardo, Cai
and Luo, 2004; Goel et al., 2004; Marino and Za´bojnı´k, 2004; Brusco and Panunzi, 2005;
Ozbas, 2005; Fulghieri and Hodrick, 2006). Like de Motta (2003) and Ozbas (2005), we
also analyze the implicit incentives of divisionalmanagers in an internal capital market.4
The main difference is that deMotta (2003) and Ozbas (2005) assume that companies are
organized along product lines—M-form—whereas we treat this organizational choice as
an endogenous variable. In addition, our paper studies divisional managers’ incentives
to maximize shareholder value—exert effort—whereas Ozbas (2005) focuses on their
incentives to disclose information to headquarters. We share with Bernardo et al. (2004)
the interest in divisionalmanagers’ incentives, in particular their incentives to cooperate.
We find conditions underwhich suchmanagers cooperate, but we depart fromBernardo
et al. (2004) in two important aspects: the nature of the incentives (i.e., our emphasis
is on implicit rather than explicit incentives), and the fact that organizational form is
endogenous in our model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
Section 3 solves the model, and Section 4 offers concluding remarks.
2. Model
We consider a companywith N ≥ 1 different lines of business or products each requiring
a continuum of tasks or functions of size 1 to be undertaken. The company’s problem
is to choose the organizational form that maximizes its profits given these constraints.
An organizational form is simply a choice of N divisions which may be defined along
product lines, functional lines, or a combination of both. In order to abstract from the
fact that the relative importance of different products or functions may bias the choice
of organizational form, we assume that all products and functions are a priori identical.
More special cases where some products or functions are more important than others
can then be better understood as departures from the symmetric case.
Production requiresmanagerial work and financial resources. As far asmanagerial
work is concerned, we assume that there are N a priori identical divisional managers.
Divisional managers can take unobserved actions that are costly to them (i.e., they
require effort, time, and attention) but increase profits. In particular, manager j can take
two types of actions, some of which (denoted by e j ≥ 0) are aimed at directly increasing
the productivity of her division, while others (denoted by c j ≥ 0) are aimed at increasing
the overall productivity of the company. We can think of the latter type of actions as
helping managers of other divisions (cooperation). (See Itoh (1991) for a paper that
makes a similar assumption in an otherwise different set-up.) To focus on the benefits
that these types of actions provide, we assume that e j and c j are perfect substitutes in
the manager’s cost function, and, for simplicity, that this cost function is quadratic, that
is, τ2 (e j + c j )2 where τ > 0.
4. We also share with Goel et al. (2004) the emphasis on implicit incentives but depart from their model in
many other respects. We are mainly interested in divisional managers’ rather than headquarters’ incentives.
Moreover Goel et al. (2004) are concerned with internal distortions such as cross-subsidization that may
occur in M-form organizations. In contrast, following Stein (1997) we assume that, given the information
available to headquarters, internal resources are efficiently allocated across divisions and, more importantly,
we endogenize the choice of organizational form.
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Financial resources are obtained from investors and are then allocated by corporate
headquarters across the different products or lines of business. We use Ft to denote the
total amount of funds raised by the company at time t, and Iit to denote the part of these
funds allocated to product i , with
∑N
i=1 Iit ≤ Ft. Investors, corporate headquarters, and
divisional managers are all assumed to be risk neutral and have different objectives:
whereas investors own the corporation and hence seek to maximize profits, corporate
headquarters anddivisionalmanagers are “empire builders.” In particular, headquarters
seek to maximize the firm’s total investment, Ft, and provided that total investment is
maximized, choose the allocation of resources {Iit} that maximizes expected profits.
Divisional managers are also empire builders but, unlike corporate headquarters, are
only concerned with maximizing investment in their own divisions. These assumptions
are similar to Stein (1997) and Hart and Holmstro¨m (2010) and capture the fact that
while corporate headquarters are subject to agency problems—in this case they are
empire builders—they have more balanced incentives than divisional managers. Notice
that the nature of the conflict between investors and headquarters is that the latter will
have an incentive to overstate the financial needs of the corporation, but ultimately
investors, who own the corporation, decide about the payout policy and total amount
invested in each period. Hence, the assumption that investors decide about the funds Ft
available for investment in each period t is consistent with the fact that all or part of the
financing may come from retained earnings.
The empire-building hypothesis dates back (at least) to Schumpeter (1934). Man-
agers may have several motivations for growing their firms which include a desire
for status, power, and increased compensation (e.g., Baumol, 1959; Williamson, 1974;
Jensen, 1986). Lang et al. (1991) provided one of the first empirical tests of Jensen’s
free-cash flow hypothesis, that is, of the idea that managers realize personal gains from
empire-building and that firms with abundant cash-flows are likely to engage in value-
destroying acquisitions. Their results support the free-cash flow hypothesis and suggest
that empire-building behavior is indeed economically significant.5 More recent stud-
ies have also documented a link between firms’ corporate governance and managers’
empire-building behavior: for instance,Masulis et al. (2007) show thatmanagers at firms
protected by more anti-takeover provisions, and hence less subject to the disciplinary
power of the market for corporate control, are more likely to indulge in acquisitions that
destroy shareholder value.
A division is defined by the set of tasks that are carried out by a single manager.
Divisional managers have limited capabilities that make it impossible for them to man-
age an unlimited number of products or functions. Specifically, there is a continuum of
tasks or functions of size N to be carried out (i.e., N products each requiring a contin-
uum of tasks of size 1) and we assume that a divisional manager cannot manage more
than a continuum of size 1 of those tasks. This assumption is in line with Williamson’s
(1975) emphasis on bounded rationality as a key to understanding organizational design
problems.
This set up allows for different types of departmentation. For example, one possi-
bility is product departmentation, whereby each divisional manager has responsibilities
5. Lang et al. (1991) show that an increase in free cash-flow equal to one percent of a bidder’s total assets
is associated with a decrease in the bidder’s gain from the takeover equal to approximately one percent of the
value of the bidder’s common stock. Another influential paper, Morck et al. (1990), documents that returns
to bidding shareholders are lower when their firm diversifies and when the performance of its managers has
been poor before the acquisition. They argue that these results are consistent with the idea that managerial
rather than shareholders’ objectives drive bad acquisitions.
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over all tasks of a single product (an M-form). Alternatively, functional departmenta-
tion makes each divisional manager responsible for a proportion 1/N of the tasks in
each of the N products (a U-form). Assuming all divisional managers are identical, let
β ∈ [1/N, 1] be the proportion of product i ’s tasks performed bymanager i—the remain-
ing tasks, (1− β), being performed by the remaining (N − 1) managers. Thus, manager
i undertakes β tasks concerning product i , and (1−β)N−1 tasks concerning each of the other
(N − 1) products.6 β represents the extent of product departmentation: its lowest value,
β = 1/N, corresponds to the U-form, and its highest value, β = 1, corresponds to the
M-form. The intermediate values (1/N < β < 1) correspond to hybrid forms where a
manager is responsible for most of the tasks concerning a product but there are a few
functions that are shared across products.
Notice that in the U-Form as the number of products increases so does the num-
ber of functional divisions. Intuitively, as a firm grows, even if the number of broad
functional areas (e.g., marketing, finance, and operations) remains the same, each area
becomesmore complex and requiresmore tasks and hencemoremanagers. For instance,
in a small firm with just a few products a single manager may be able to handle all the
necessary marketing-related tasks. However, if the number of products increases more
managers will be needed, each of them specialized in one aspect of marketing (e.g.,
strategic vs. operational marketing).
Using ai to denote the total amount of effort devoted to directly increase the
productivity of product i , we have
ai = βei + (1− β)
∑
j =i
e j
N − 1 . (1)
In the above expression, the subscript in ai stands for a product, whereas the subscript
in ei refers to a manager:7 thus, according to equation (1), manager i is responsible
for a proportion β of the functions in product i and devotes effort ei to increase the
productivity of her division; and manager j = i , is responsible for a proportion 1−βN−1
of the functions in product i and devotes effort e j to increase the productivity of her
division. Notice that Ni=1ai = Nj=1e j , which is independent of β: this implies that the
only role of β is to capture how effort is divided across managers and divisions for a
given level of total effort; and it guarantees that our modeling choices do not bias the
choice of organizational form.8
There are two periods in the model (t = 1, 2) and no discounting. Each period t
consists of three stages: at stage 1, investors determine the total amount of funds Ft;
at stage 2, corporate headquarters invest these funds across the different products; and
at stage 3 profits are realized.9 Divisional managers choose their actions in period 1,
6. Note that each manager undertakes a continuum of tasks of size 1 in total, that is, β + (N − 1) (1−β)N−1 = 1.
7. This is a slight abuse of notation but will avoid unnecessary cumbersome expressions. Note that there
is no loss of generality because all managers, products and functions are assumed to be ex ante identical
throughout the paper.
8. Note also that according to equation (1), if all managers provide the same effort level (i.e., if ei = e for
every i) the total amount of effort devoted to directly increase the productivity of product i does not depend
on β (i.e., ai = e). This implies that in any symmetric solution, if effort choices were perfectly observable and
contractible, β would be irrelevant. As we show in the next section, when effort is not observable managers’
effort choices do depend on β, and hence there is an optimal organizational form for each set of parameters.
This implies that in our model all differences among organizational forms are exclusively due to the way in
which those organizational structures influence managerial incentives.
9. Notice that headquarters are free to decide how funds are allocated across products, but must allocate
functional resources in fixed proportions. As noted in the Introduction, this is a simplifying assumption which
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between stages 2 and 3, that is, after the funds have been allocated but before profits are
realized.10
The marginal return of investment in each product i depends upon a parameter ηi ,
which is constant and unknown. This parameter captures stable, long term factors that
affect profits but are not perfectly known bymanagement. More precisely, ηi determines
the long-run marginal return of investment in product i . Although each ηi is unknown,
all the parties (investors, headquarters and divisional managers) have some prior belief
about {η j }, which can be described by a set of independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) randomvariables characterized by a normal distribution ofmeanμη and precision
hη. Profits are affected not only by long-term factors, but also by transitory shocks. We
model the latter as a set of i.i.d. random variables {εi t} (for i = 1, ...N and t = 1, 2 ).
These variables are assumed to be independent from the long-term variables {η j } and
are normally distributed with zero mean and precision hε. Therefore, for each product i
profits depend upon the managers’ actions, {e j } and {c j }, the level of investment, Iit , the
long-term factor represented by ηi , and the transitory shock, εi t. Specifically, product i ’s
profits in period t are denoted by πi t and are given by:
πi1 =
(
ηi + ai + ψ
N∑
h=1
ch
N
+ εi1
)
Ii1 − 12 I
2
i1 (2)
πi2 = (ηi + εi2)Ii2 − 12 I
2
i2, (3)
where ai is determined by equation (1) above. In equations (2) and (3), the first right-
hand side term represents the return of the investment and the second term represents
the cost. Parameter ψ measures the extent of complementarity among product lines and
determines the marginal return of interdivisional cooperation.11 For example, marginal
returns from cooperation will be high in the presence of economies of scope, when
product lines share a valuable tangible or intangible asset ( e.g., a production plant, a
commercial network, or a well-reputed brand name), or in cases in which the company
is undertaking related rather than unrelated investments. We assume that ψ > 1, which
implies that cooperation is desirable, and within this scenario we analyze under what
circumstances managers will have incentives to cooperate.12
Each divisional manager is concerned with the investments in her own division,
defined by the sets of tasks that she is responsible for. For instance, in the M-form a
divisional manager cares only about the investment made in her product, while in the
U-Form she cares about the part of the investment in each product that is assigned to
captures the fact that there is greater substitutability across products than across functions and is consistent
with the empirical evidence that documents the importance of firms’ acquisition and divestiture activities (see
for instance, Mulherin and Boone, 2000; Villalonga and McGahan, 2005).
10. Note that at t = 2, divisional managers will not have incentives to take privately costly actions because
at that time all the investment decisions will have already been made.
11. Notice that interdivisional cooperation is modeled in such a way that the number of divisions N does
not exogenously affect the effectiveness of cooperation: the level of cooperation is determined by the average
cooperative effort among divisional managers,
∑N
h=1 ch/N. In fact, neither the organizational form, β, nor the
number of divisions, N, affect the effectiveness of cooperation.
12. The management literature (e.g., Williamson, 1975) stresses that interdivisional cooperation is desir-
able, but is often not achieved because managers behave opportunistically. If ψ < 1 cooperation (i.e., c j > 0)
would never be optimal.
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her function, that is 1/N of the total investment,Ni=1(Ii1 + Ii2). Thus divisional manager
j ′s utility function can be defined as
uj = β(I j1 + I j2)+ (1− β)N − 1
∑
i = j
(Ii1 + Ii2)− τ2 (e j + c j )
2. (4)
This utility function captures the fact that managers derive private benefits from the
resources linked to their respective divisions.13 Thus, manager j carries out a proportion
β of tasks related to product j , and therefore derives private benefits β(I j1 + I j2) from
the investment in that product. In addition, manager j is responsible for a proportion
(1−β)
N−1 of the tasks in each of the other i = j products, and therefore derives private
benefits from the investment in those products (proportionally to her participation in
those products or lines of business). We assume that managers’ participation constraints
are not binding, that is, while different organizational structures will be associated to
different levels of investment and effort—different utility—the utility that managers
obtain working for the firm is higher than the utility in their best outside option.14
Note that in the divisional manager’s utility function (4) there is no scope for monetary
pay-for-performance compensation schemes, which is in the spirit of the paper that
focuses on implicit rather than on explicit incentives. Implicit incentives are particularly
important for divisional managers because, among other things, they are at an earlier
career stage than CEOs. Furthermore, to the extent that providing explicit incentives is
costly to the firm (e.g., because of risk aversion, lack of congruity, or multitask problems)
implicit incentives would remain valuable even in the presence of explicit incentives.15
Throughout the twoperiods, the parties involved learn about theprofitability of the
N lines of business or products inwhich the company is active. Specifically, headquarters
and investors will update their prior beliefs about {η j } as they receive more information
about the various lines of business. We model investors’ and headquarters’ learning
process by assuming that both investors and headquarters observe period 1 profits and
investments, {Ii1} and {πi1}, and in addition, that they can sort out part of the transitory
shocks that affect profits in period 1, {εi1}. This assumption is equivalent to assuming
that investors and headquarters extract a set of signals, {sInvi1 } and {sHQi1 } respectively,
about product i ’s marginal return of investment based on period 1 profits,
ski1 = ηi + ai + ψ
N∑
h=1
ch
N
+ εki1, (5)
where k ∈ {Inv, HQ} and εki1 are i.i.d. random variables normally distributed with zero
mean and precision hkε ≥ hε.
13. Empirical evidence on managerial compensation shows that there is a high correlation between the
level of compensation and firm size. To the extent that managers perceive this relationship, they may try to
augment the size of their corporation by increasing the level of investment. Managers also derive private
benefits (e.g., social status) from running a large organization.
14. This is typically the case in moral hazard models in which managers have limited wealth (e.g., when
divisional managers obtain future benefits—getting a job as a CEO in another firm—that they cannot pay for
up-front).
15. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Chevalier and Ellison (1999) document the importance of implicit
incentives. Furthermore, Dittmann and Maugh (2007) calibrate the standard explicit pay-for-performance
principal-agent model and show that this model has a hard time rationalizing the compensation contracts
observed in practice.
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Wealso assume that headquarters have an informational advantage over investors,
hHQε ≥ hInvε , and hence that headquarters can add value in the allocation of resources.
For instance, if εi1 were to have three independent components, εi1 = εi1a + εi1b + εi1c ,
we can think of investors observing {{Ii1},{πi1},{εi1c}} and headquarters observing
{{Ii1},{πi1},{εi1b},{εi1c}} so, in equation (5), investors’ and headquarters’ residual noises
would be εInvi1 = εi1a + εi1b and εHQi1 = εi1a , respectively.16 In practice, headquarters can
acquire such informational advantage through day-to-day contact with other managers,
employees, clients, or suppliers and can use their advantage to improve the allocation of
resources inside the corporation. Notice that the information available to headquarters
and investors does not depend on the organizational form chosen by the corporation.
Hence, our results are not going to be driven by differences in observability across
organizational structures.17
Finally, we assume that investors and corporate headquarters cannot commit to
financing decisions that are ex post inefficient. In practice, an important part of the
information that determines the optimal level of investment (e.g., industry prospects,
firm characteristics, etc.) cannot be fully contracted upon; and ignoring this information
and contracting ex ante is likely to be prohibitively expensive.
3. Organizational Structure and Incentives
This section solves the model and derives the main results.
3.1 Managers’ Behavior
3.1.1 Second Period
Consider stage 2 first. As headquarters are empire builders, they maximize corporate
profits subject to investing all available funds, that is,
∑N
i=1 Ii2 = F2.
max
{Ii2} s.t.
∑N
i=1 Ii2=F2
E
[
N∑
i=1
[
(ηi + εi2)Ii2 − 12 I
2
i2
] ∣∣∣∣sHQi1
]
. (6)
Assuming an interior solution, the level of investment in product i is given by:
I ∗i2
(
sHQ·1
) = F2
N
+
{
E
(
ηi
∣∣sHQi1 )− 1N
N∑
h=1
E
(
ηh
∣∣sHQh1 )
}
, (7)
where sHQ·1 ≡ {sHQh1 }. Note that each product i receives an equal share of the total funds
(first term in equation (7)) plus some additional funding that depends on whether
16. As will become clear below, this information structure implies that headquarters have both an infor-
mational advantage and provide stronger incentives than investors. However, our results are robust to an
alternative specification in which headquarters would still have an informational advantage yet investors
would provide stronger incentives than headquarters. For instance, this could be the case if headquarters
were to observe another signal on ηi which is not related to profits. (See for instance Cre´mer (1995) and
de Motta (2003), for examples in which information reduces implicit incentives.) We choose this particular
specification for expositional clarity but our results do not depend on whether investors provide stronger or
weaker incentives than headquarters.
17. In this sense, our paper is complementary to a large body of literature that relates organizational design
and incentives to differences in observability across organizational forms (e.g., Maskin et al., 2000; Ortega,
2003; Besanko et al., 2005; Harstad, 2007).
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headquarters perceive that the marginal return of investment for that product is above
or below the averagemarginal return for thewhole corporation (second term in equation
(7)).
At stage 1, investors provide the level of funding F2 that maximizes expected prof-
its, taking into account how corporate headquarters are subsequently going to allocate
those funds across the different products, that is, {I ∗i2}. Thus investors solve
max
F2
E
[
N∑
i=1
[
(ηi + εi2)I ∗i2
(
sHQ·1
)− 1
2
I ∗2i2
(
sHQ·1
)] ∣∣∣∣sInvi1
]
. (8)
The first-order condition gives the amount of funds received by the firm at t = 2:
F ∗2
(
sInv·1
) = N∑
i=1
E
(
ηi
∣∣sInvi1 ), (9)
where sInv·1 ≡ {sInvh1 }. Equation (9) shows that the total amount of funds equals the sum of
the expected marginal return of the different lines of business (or products) in which the
corporation operates. Replacing (9) in (7), we obtain the optimal investment in product
i at t = 2:
I ∗i2
(
sHQ·1 , s
Inv
·1
) =
N∑
h=1
E
(
ηh
∣∣sInvh1 )
N
+
{
E
(
ηi
∣∣sHQi1 )− 1N
N∑
h=1
E
(
ηh
∣∣sHQh1 )
}
. (10)
3.1.2 First Period
Equation (10) characterizes the investment in product i at t = 2 given investors’ and
headquarters’ assessments of the different products. Such assessments are based on
all the information available to them at the beginning of period 2 and, more specif-
ically, upon period 1 profits. All else equal, products that generate greater profits at
t = 1 will be considered more profitable than the rest and will therefore receive more
generous funding at t = 2. As divisional managers are empire builders and seek to
attract the maximum amount of funds to their respective divisions, they will have
an incentive to take actions that increase period 1 profits.18 In particular, in period
1 divisional manager j will choose the combination of actions, e j and c j , that maxi-
mizes her expected utility given by equation (4), taking into account how headquarters
will make her investment decisions at t = 2, which is given by equation (10).19 The
program
max
e j ,c j
E
{
I ∗i2
(
sHQ·1 , s
Inv
·1
)∣∣ e j , c j}− τ2 (e j + c j )2, (11)
18. As there is no private information when these actions (e j , c j ) are taken, investors and headquarters
are able to infer them equilibrium (see Holmstro¨m, 1982 for the seminal paper on career concerns).
19. Note that at the time of choosing the actions (e j , c j ) the investment decision at t = 1 has already been
made.
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where second-period investment I ∗i2(s
HQ
·1 , s
Inv
·1 ) is given by equation (10), yields the fol-
lowing two first order conditions (for xj ∈ {e j , c j }):
τ (e∗j + c∗j ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∂E
[
E
(
ηi
∣∣sInvi1 )|e j , c j ]
∂xj︸ ︷︷ ︸
External Incentives
(12)
+
(
β − 1
N
)⎡⎣∂E
[
E
(
η j
∣∣sHQj1 )|e j , c j]
∂xj
− 1
N − 1
∑
i = j
∂E
[
E
(
ηi
∣∣sHQi1 )|e j , c j]
∂xj
⎤⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Internal Incentives
+ λxj ,
where λxj is the Kuhn–Tucker multiplier associated to the nonnegativity constraint (i.e.,
xj ≥ 0). Notice that the normality assumption implies that ∂E[E(ηi |s
k
i1)|e j ,c j ]
∂xj
is a constant,
that is, does not depend on the actions {e j , c j } or the conjectured actions {e∗j , c∗j }.
According to equation (12) divisional managers have incentives to influence in-
vestors’ assessment of the whole corporation, as well as headquarters’ assessment of
their divisions. On the one hand, investors’ assessment of the corporation determines
the total amount of funds available for investment. On the other hand, headquarters’
assessment of the divisions determines the share of those funds channeled to each divi-
sion by corporate headquarters. Thus, divisional managers’ incentives come from two
different sources: an external one—making a good impression on investors—and an
internal one—making a good impression on headquarters. From now on we refer to
these two sources of incentives as “external” and “internal” incentives.
3.2 External and Internal Incentives
Next we show that the twomost common types of organizational structure, U-form and
M-form, lead to different combinations of external and internal incentives.
Consider external incentives first, that is, the first term on the right-hand side of
equation (12). In both U-form and M-form organizations divisional managers have an
incentive to increase profits in their respective divisions because the whole corporation
will then be perceived by the capital market as more profitable and investors will in
turn provide more funding. At the same time, however, managers are subject to a
free-riding problem: when a manager improves her division’s performance, she helps
the firm obtain more funding, but benefits only partially from the additional funding
because such extra funds will be distributed across all divisions in the corporation.
This distribution means that the assessment of the whole corporation is a public good
for divisional managers, who are consequently tempted to free-ride. Notice that the
free-riding problem is common to the U-form and the M-form: in both cases divisional
managers are aware that any extra funding will be distributed across all divisions.
Consider internal incentives now, that is, the second term on the right hand side
in equation (12). In a U-form, every division is responsible for a proportion 1/N of
the functions in each of the N products. Therefore, each divisional manager always
controls a proportion 1/N of the total funds available, which means that the internal
allocation of resources across products is a zero-sum game for divisional managers. In
fact, notice that in equation (12), when β = 1/N, incentives are entirely determined by
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the capitalmarket. In theM-form (β = 1), however,managers have to internally compete
for resources: managers whose divisions, which in the M-form correspond to different
products, are perceived to perform better than the average receive more funding from
headquarters. Hence, in the M-form the internal capital market is a source of incentives
for divisional managers, whereas in the U-form it plays no incentive role.
Notice that this result hinges on the assumption that the allocation of resources
takes place across products or business lines rather than across functions (or more gen-
erally, that headquarters’ reallocation of resources across products is relatively more
important than across functions). This assumption is consistent with the fact that in
the medium and long-run there is much more re-allocation of financial resources across
product lines than across functions. For example, the 1980s wave of corporate restruc-
turing in the United States involved a move from a diversification strategy to a focus
on core businesses (Donaldson, 1994). Intuitively, while each product always requires
a number of functions, the firm can decide which and how many products or business
lines to pursue.
Finally, consider the comparative statics as the number of products N increases.
The free-riding problem becomes more severe because total resources have to be shared
by an increasing number of divisions. As a consequence, external incentives decrease
in both U-form and M-form organizations. In the U-form, because all divisional man-
agers’ incentives are external, total incentives also decrease.20 However, in the M-form,
as the number of products increases managers have to compete with more divisions for
a limited amount of internal resources, which increases internal incentives. Mathemat-
ically, in equation (12), if β = 1 (i.e., M-form) total incentives are a weighted average
of the incentives provided by the capital market and corporate headquarters, with the
weights depending on the number of products. In the limit, as N → ∞, incentives are
entirely determined by corporate headquarters. The following proposition summarizes
the above discussion.
Proposition 1: (a) In the U-form, managerial incentives are entirely determined by the
capital market, and decrease as the number of products N increases. (b) In theM-form,managerial
incentives are determined by both the capital market and headquarters; moreover, as N increases,
headquarters replace the capital market in the provision of managerial incentives.
To understand the reach of this proposition it must be noted that it is not driven
by differences in observability across organizational forms, that is, the precision with
which performance is observed is assumed to be the same in U-forms and M-forms.
The result instead highlights that the stakes and consequently the interests of divisional
managers differ across organizational forms. This is an important differencewith respect
to previous literature,which posits thatmanagerial incentives vary across organizational
forms because of variation in the costs of providing explicitmonetary incentives (Maskin
et al., 2000; Besanko et al., 2005). Proposition 1 points out that the problem is a more
fundamental one: even in the absence of explicit incentive schemes, divisional managers
will behave differently across organizational forms, because different organizational
structures imply different allocations of responsibility.
20. The fact that incentives in theU-formdecrease as the number of divisions increases does not necessarily
mean that in U-forms it is optimal to have only one product (N = 1). Corporate headquarters, due to their
information advantage, can improve the investors’ allocation of resources and, hence, there is a benefit from
being diversified (N > 1).
12
3.3 Incentives to Cooperate
In the previous section we have examined the level of incentives without discussing
which specific actions managers would be motivated to take. But in fact, divisional
managers may direct their efforts toward very different (and potentially conflicting)
goals, as the above discussion on internal and external incentives already suggests.
Interdivisional cooperation, for example, can be of great importance to the firm, but
divisional managers are not always ready to cooperate, particularly when they perceive
cooperation to be detrimental to their own individual goals. In such cases, the relevant
question is not how to increase managers’ incentives, but rather how to make sure
that managers will cooperate with one another. In this section we analyze how the
organizational form affects divisional managers’ incentives to cooperate.
Considering equation (1) and using the assumption in equation (5) it follows that
∂E
(
ηi
∣∣ski1)
∂ei
= β E
(
ηi
∣∣ski1)
∂ski1
(13)
∂E
(
ηi
∣∣ski1)
∂e j
= 1− β
N − 1
E
(
ηi
∣∣ski1)
∂ski1
for i = j (14)
and that
∂E
(
ηi
∣∣ski1)
∂ckj
= ψ
N
∂E
(
ηi
∣∣ski1)
∂ski1
. (15)
Using the three equations above and given the symmetry across managers, functions
and products the two first order conditions in equation (12) can be rewritten as
τ (e∗ + c∗) = 1
N
Inv + (Nβ − 1)
2
N(N − 1)
HQ + λe (16)
and
τ (e∗ + c∗) = ψ
N
Inv + λc , (17)
where k ≡ ∂E[E(η|ski1)|e∗,c∗]
∂ski1
for k ∈ {Inv, HQ}. Thus Inv and HQ determine external
and internal incentives. For instance, in the case in which c∗ = 0 (i.e., λe = 0 and λc > 0)
external incentives would be 
Inv
N and internal incentives would be
(Nβ−1)2
N(N−1)
HQ.
Note that given the informational structure and the distributional assumptions
(i.i.d. and normality for all i, j) k = hkεhη+hkε for k = Inv and k = HQ, respectively. Under
alternative informational structures, the specific relation between k and the precisions
would change, but as long as i.i.d. and normality hold, first-order conditions would still
be given by equations (16) and (17). In this sense, the model is robust to certain changes
in the informational structure.21
21. For example, if for each division i headquarters were to observe (in addition to sHQi1 ) another signal
about ηi nonrelated to current profits, HQ would tend to be smaller than in the current set-up as part of the
weight in the posterior would be shifted toward this additional signal. However, assuming i.i.d. and normality
(and appropriately redefining k ) the first-order conditions would still be given by equations (16) and (17).
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Equations (16) and (17) imply that there is a threshold β̂ (as defined by equation
(18)) such that if β > β̂ then e∗ > 0 = c∗, and if β ≤ β̂ then c∗ > 0 = e∗:22
ψ
N
Inv = 1
N
Inv + (Nβ̂ − 1)
2
N(N − 1)
HQ. (18)
From this discussion the next proposition follows:
Proposition 2: (a) If β ≤ β̂ the unique equilibrium is cooperative, that is, c∗ > 0 = e∗;
if β > β̂ the unique equilibrium is noncooperative, that is, e∗ > 0 = c∗. (b) Total managerial
incentives e∗ + c∗ are increasing in β, the extent of product-based departmentation.
The intuition behind (a) relies on the very different nature of external and internal
incentives: external incentives depend on the investors’ perceived efficiency of thewhole
corporation, while internal incentives depend on headquarters’ perceived efficiency
of each product relative to the perceived efficiency of all other products within the
corporation. As the corporation shifts toward a product-based form of organization—as
β increases—internal competition for resources intensifies and managers have lower
incentives to cooperate.
It is also apparent from equations (16) and (17) that as β increases total managerial
incentives e∗ + c∗ increase for any number of products N > 1.23 Intuitively, as β increases
the equilibriumswitches fromcooperative tononcooperative, andonce anoncooperative
equilibrium is reached, further increases in β intensify the internal competition for
resources, thus inducing higher managerial effort e∗.
As β increases from 1/N to 1 the organization evolves from aU-form to anM-form,
the next corollary follows (using the superscripts U and M for U-form and M-form,
respectively):
Corollary 1: Total incentives are always stronger in anM-form than in aU-form: eU + cU ≤
eM + cM.
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 are interesting in the context of the internal capital
markets literature, where multidivisional firms are often considered to be plagued with
internal power struggles and influence activities (e.g., Rajan et al., 2000). The proposition
points out that such lack of cooperation among managers is not intrinsically linked to
headquarters’ ability to re-allocate resources across the different lines of business or
products. Instead, it has to do with the internal competition for corporate resources
that some organizational structures—notably theM-form—generate. This only becomes
apparent when the choice of organizational structure is allowed to be endogenous.
The next proposition considers the comparative statics from equations (16) and
(17) and characterizes the incentives to cooperate:
Proposition 3: (a) In the U-form managers always cooperate. (b) In the M-form managers
are more likely to cooperate the stronger the incentives provided by the capital market, Inv;
the weaker the incentives provided by corporate headquarters, HQ; the smaller the number of
products, N; and the larger the complementarities across products, ψ .
22. To simplify the exposition, we assume that in the knife-edge case in which β = β̂ managers cooperate,
that is, c∗ > 0 = e∗.
23. From equations (16) and (17), it follows that ∂(e∗ + c∗)/∂β = 0 for β ≤ β̂ and ∂(e∗ + c∗)/∂β > 0 for
β > β̂.
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Consider the U-form first (β = 1/N). The first-order conditions—equations (16)
and (17)—can be rewritten as:
τ (eU + cU) = 1
N
Inv + λe (19)
τ (eU + cU) = ψ
N
Inv + λc . (20)
As λc ≥ 0 and ψ > 1, it must be the case that λe > 0 and therefore eU = 0, which implies
that cU > 0, that is, the U-form equilibrium is always one in which divisional managers
cooperate. Intuitively, because ψ > 1, the marginal return of cooperation (c) given by
equation (20), is greater than themarginal return of noncooperation (e) given by equation
(19). Therefore cU > 0 = eU , where cU is given by
cU = ψ
τN
Inv. (21)
Consider now the M-form (β = 1). Two alternative scenarios may arise: if β̂ ≥ 1,
that is, if
1
N
Inv + N − 1
N
HQ ≤ ψ
N
Inv, (22)
the unique equilibrium is cooperative and managerial incentives are the same as in the
U-form (cM = cU > 0 and eM = eU = 0). Alternatively, if β̂ < 1 the unique equilibrium is
noncooperative (cM = 0 and eM > 0) and managerial incentives are a weighted average
of external and internal incentives:
eM = 1
τN
Inv + N − 1
τN
HQ. (23)
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration for the case in which β̂ < 1. When β ≤ β̂
the equilibrium is such that managers cooperate, whereas if β > β̂ managers choose not
to cooperate. The figure also illustrates that total incentives increase as β increases.24
When doM-formmanagers cooperate?As stated in Proposition 3, and according to
the above condition (22), the M-form is more likely to have a cooperative equilibrium as
ψ increases: if complementarities among product lines are sufficiently strong, divisional
managers are more likely to cooperate in an attempt to increase the total funding that
the corporation receives. In addition, managers also cooperate more when there are
fewer lines of business (a low N) and hence internal competition for resources is less
intense. Finally, cooperation becomesmore likely if the incentives providedby the capital
market (Inv) strengthen, or the incentives provided by corporate headquarters (HQ)
weaken. For instance, stronger internal incentives imply that divisional managers are
more concerned with headquarters’ perceived efficiency of their divisions relative to the
perceived efficiency of all the other divisions, and are therefore less willing to cooperate
with other divisions.25
24. In the alternative case in which β̂ ≥ 1, for any organizational form β ∈ [1/N, 1] the equilibriumwould
be one of cooperation, (i.e., only the left part of the graph would be applicable, so that for all β ∈ [1/N, 1] we
would have c∗ = cM = cU > 0 = e∗).
25. Under our informational structure anddistributional assumptions,k = hkε
hη+hkε
. Therefore comparative
statics with respect to the precisions could also be easily obtained.
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FIGURE 1. DIVISIONAL MANAGERS’ EFFORT AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
The fact that the M-form equilibrium is cooperative for some parameters of the
model and noncooperative for others is consistent with Hill et al.’s (1992) observation
that in practice some M-forms are “cooperative”and some are “competitive.” Their
research shows that cooperative M-forms are designed to exploit economies of scope,
whereas competitive M-forms are meant to efficiently allocate financial resources across
divisions. Both dimensions are taken into account in our model: economies of scope are
parameterized by ψ , and the allocation of financial resources is endogenously built in
the model. Thus in our model financial resources are always efficiently allocated across
divisions, and cooperation arises endogenously when complementarities across lines of
business are high enough.
3.4 Organizational Structure
We can now characterize the choice of organizational structure and derive the main
results of the paper. Note that the M-form generates stronger incentives than the U-
form, but does not necessarily produce larger profits. As a matter of fact, the U-form
generates more profits than the M-form if and only if ψcU > eM. In other words, while
the M-form provides stronger incentives, it might be more profitable to produce with
lower incentives and greater inter-divisional cooperation (i.e., if eM < ψcU the extra
incentives the M-form generates do not compensate for the lack of cooperation).
Proposition 4: Let ψ be the level of complementarity across product lines such that ψ =
eM/cU then the M-form is strictly more profitable than the U-form if and only if ψ < ψ .
As Proposition 4 points out, for low levels of complementarity the M-form strictly
dominates theU-form. According to this result, if a firm grows by expanding into related
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areas of business, complementarities will be high and aU-formwill bemore appropriate
than an M-form; but if lines of business are unrelated or loosely related, an M-form will
be more adequate. In some cases of course the organizational form will be too costly
to change and the relevant question will be how the firm must grow given its current
organizational form. For those cases, Proposition 4 suggests that U-forms aremore likely
to expand into related businesses than M-forms.26
Notice also that there is a range of values [ψ , ψ] for which the U-form will strictly
dominate theM-form.Above that range (ψ > ψ) theM-formwill elicit cooperative effort
and the two organizational forms will be equivalent,27 and below that range (ψ < ψ)
the M-form will strictly dominate the U-form. The following comparative statics on ψ
can be derived from equations (21) and (23):
Proposition 5: The M-form is more likely to yield higher profits than the U-form (i.e., ψ
increases) (i) the larger the number of products, N; (ii) the weaker the incentives from the capital
market, Inv; (iii) the stronger the incentives from corporate headquarters, HQ; and (iv) the
weaker the total incentives (i.e., a simultaneous decrease in both Inv and HQ, increases ψ).
Consider first the relationship between organizational structure and firm size (part
(i) of the proposition). Themodel shows that firm growth aggravates the free-rider prob-
lem and therefore reduces external incentives in bothM-form andU-form organizations.
In M-forms, however, this is partly compensated by the fact that internal competition
increases, which leads to greater internal incentives. As a consequence of that, M-forms
become relativelymore attractive thanU-forms. This result relates toWilliamson’s (1975)
classical “M-formhypothesis,” that is, the claim thatM-forms outperformU-formswhen
firm size is large. Williamson (1975) based this hypothesis on the argument that M-
forms would have lower information costs than U-forms, for several reasons: M-forms
are generally more decentralized, the cost of providing explicit incentives is smaller in
M-forms, and the M-form allows the firm to make better capital budgeting decisions.
Proposition 5 points out that even if the two organizational structures are equally decen-
tralized, capital budgeting decisions are equally well made, and explicit incentives are
not present, M-forms will still outperform U-forms because, as the firm grows, M-forms
benefit from greater competition for internal resources.
Part (ii) links the optimal organizational form to the power of external incentives.
The extent to which investors provide strong incentives depends very much on the de-
velopment of capital markets. For instance, according to Ghemawat and Khana (1998),
in India domestic institutional investors do not have adequate skills to monitor invest-
ments and foreign institutional investors are too unfamiliar with the economy, which
results in poor external incentives.28 Part (ii) of Proposition 4 implies that in such cases
firms are more likely to adopt an M-form organization. The reason is that M-forms’
26. As we discuss below (see Proposition 5) an increase in the number of business lines (N) makes the
M-form more likely to strictly dominate the U-form. Hence Proposition 4 implies that whether this transition
toward an M-form indeed occurs depends on the complementarity between old and new lines of business.
27. Such equivalence is largely due to our conservative way of modeling the benefits from cooperation.
We are assuming that the marginal benefits from cooperation are exactly identical in the two organizational
forms in order to highlight that cooperation arises solely as a consequence of organizational form. However, in
the U-form all managers share responsibilities across all products, which arguably provides themwith greater
opportunities (in addition to greater incentives) to cooperate.
28. In terms of our model, we can think that as the capital market develops it is able to sort out a greater
part of the transitory noise that affects profits, εi t , which would be associated with an increase in implicit
incentives.
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internal competition counteracts the negative influence of poor external monitoring on
divisional managers’ incentives.29
Part (iii) indicates that M-forms tend to dominate U-forms when headquarters
play an important monitoring role. Empirical evidence indeed shows that headquarters
can have a very active monitoring role: for example, McNeil et al. (2004) compare the
probabilities of turnover following bad performance for heads of subsidiaries within
conglomerate firms versus CEOs of stand-alone firms with similar characteristics. They
find that turnover is much more sensitive to bad performance for the former than
for the latter, which suggests that incentives coming from headquarters are stronger
than those coming from investors. They also show that the sensitivity of turnover to
performance is greater for subsidiaries that operate in the same industry as the parent
firm, which suggests that headquarters’ monitoring capacity depends very much on
their informational advantage, as hypothesized in the model.
Part (iv) refers to the intensityof total incentives. The strengthof total incentiveswill
bedeterminedby investors’ andheadquarters’ learningprocesses and,moreparticularly,
by theprecisionof their priors about theprofitability ofdifferent lines of business.Weaker
priors imply that investors and headquarters are more ready to update their beliefs
(i.e., that Inv and HQ are larger). In those cases divisional managers understand that
their behavior will have stronger consequences on future funding and will, therefore,
exert more effort in both U-forms and M-forms. However, if both internal and external
incentives increase by the same intensity, their relative importance will remain constant,
but the larger marginal return of cooperative effort, that is, ψ > 1, will play in favor
of the U-form. Because prior beliefs about profitability will be particularly weak in
young industries and/or relatively young firms, part (iv) suggests that firms in younger
industries, and younger firms within an industry are more likely to exhibit a U-form
organization.
In apreviousversionof thepaper,wealso considereda three-layerM-form inwhich
capital budgeting was done in two stages instead of one: funds were first divided across
multiproduct divisions and then across products. We found that product managers’
incentives to cooperate were analogous to the two-layer incentives characterized in
Proposition 3. Our analysis also indicated that delegation (i.e., multiple layers) does not
necessarily reduce competition for internal resources, it just changes the hierarchical
level at which competition takes place.
4. Conclusions
Our analysis of divisional managers’ incentives has focused on the issues of internal
versus external incentives and competition versus cooperation. In both cases, we have
argued that organizational structure is a determinant to divisional managers’ incen-
tives. First, different organizational forms provide different combinations of internal
and external incentives. In U-forms, managerial incentives are entirely determined by
the capital market, whereas in M-forms they are influenced by both the capital market
and corporate headquarters. Second, organizational forms affectmanagers’ incentives to
cooperate. Divisionalmanagers aremore prone to cooperate inU-forms than inM-forms
because the latter give rise to internal competition for financial resources. Building on
29. Notice that in both types of organizations, U-forms and M-forms, headquarters have the same ability
to internally allocate resources across products or lines of business and hence, our results are solely driven by
managerial incentive effects.
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these two results we have shown that M-forms are preferable to U-forms when implicit
incentives are weaker (e.g., in older industries and in older firms within an industry),
the capital market is not well developed, the number of products is greater, and when
the benefits from cooperation are smaller.
While in this paperwe argue about the importance ofmanagers’ implicit incentives
within corporations, an even stronger case can be made for nonprofit and government
organizations. In fact, in many of these organizations explicit incentives play a minor
role and implicit incentives considerations become even more important. We think that
future research should pay closer attention to the way in which organizational choices
affect implicit incentives in these nonprofit organizations.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Part (a). In the case of the U-form (i.e., β = 1/N) the two first order
conditions (see equation (12)) are
τ
(
eUj + cUj
) = 1
N
∂
N∑
i=1
E
[
E
(
ηi
∣∣sInvi1 )|eUj , cUj ]
∂xj
+ λxj for xj ∈ {e j , c j }, (A1)
which means that managerial incentives are entirely determined by the assessment of
the capital market, and decrease as the number of products, N, increases.
Part (b) In the case of the M-form (i.e., β = 1), the two first order conditions (see
equation (12)) are
τ
(
eMj + cMj
) = 1
N
∂
N∑
i=1
E
[
E
(
ηi
∣∣sInvi1 )∣∣eMj , cMj ]
∂xj
(A2)
+N − 1
N
⎛⎝∂E
[
E(η j | sHQj1 )|eMj , cMj
]
∂xj
− 1
N − 1
∑
i = j
∂E
[
E
(
ηi
∣∣sHQi1 )|eMj , cMj ]
∂xj
⎞⎠+ λxj
for xj ∈ {e j , c j }, which implies that managerial incentives depend on both the head-
quarters’ assessment of the divisions (first term) and the investors’ assessment of the
corporation (second term),with the relative importance beingdeterminedby thenumber
of products, N. 
Proof of Proposition 5 Part (iv). As shown in Section 4.4, ψ is given by
ψcU = eM, (A3)
where the superscripts U and M refer to the U-form and the (noncooperative) M-form,
respectively. The first-order conditions (21) and (23) imply that
cU = ψ
N
Inv (A4)
eM = 1
N
Inv + N − 1
N
HQ. (A5)
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Replacing cU and eM in (A3), we can write
ψ
ψ
N
Inv = 1
N
Inv + N − 1
N
HQ (A6)
and therefore
ψ2 = 1+ (N − 1)
HQ
Inv
. (A7)
Differentiating with respect to HQ and Inv,
dψ2 = (N − 1)
[
1
Inv
dHQ − 
HQ
(Inv)2
dInv
]
. (A8)
If dInv = dHQ ≡ d, then
dψ2 = (N − 1)
Inv − HQ
(Inv)2
d. (A9)
Now notice that, from equation (A3), at ψ = ψ we have Inv < HQ. Therefore
dψ
d
< 0. (A10)

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